En este trabajo se investigará el modo propio en el que el filósofo Maurice Merleau-Ponty ha utilizado el método fenomenológico. Entender el ser, para él, no es alcanzar una verdad absoluta, reservada a una élite intelectual. Comprender el mundo es, al contrario, bajar, hacer silencio, ponerse al nivel del ser y de una cierta manera ver las cosas desde su perspectiva. Emprender el camino del conocimiento es, pues, descender y observar la existencia desde sus múltiples facetas sin renunciar al trabajo (...) de la inteligencia. Por ello, recorreremos los temas principales que caracterizan la fenomenología del primer Merleau-Ponty desde los fenómenos hasta la historia pasando por la existencia y el otro. (shrink)

This essay proposes interdisciplinary work converging around a concept (the Anthropocene), a philosophical tradition (phenomenology), and an author (Merleau-Ponty) in order to overcome the limits of intelligibility to which can be confronted approaches that favor a single perspective on these themes, or a single theme approached from different perspectives. The first section of the essay develops a triple return to the foundations of the problem which interests us by treating in a synthetic manner the following three questions: what is the (...) Anthropocene? What does the idea of human autonomy truly mean? Can phenomenology help us think their encounter? The second section briefly introduces the reflective context in which Merleau-Ponty developed his thinking on Nature, on the human being as it emerges from Nature, and on technique in its relation both to the human being and to Nature. By adopting Merleau-Pontyan thought as a critical framework, the third section examines the current paradigm for the co-production of scientific knowledge and its implication for the inclusion of non-human nature. (shrink)

As the internet becomes increasingly important in establishing identities and social networks, it becomes a mechanism for social control. We apply the components of Foucault’s means of corrective training—hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination—to the comments section of a popular couponing blog to analyze tactics participants use to discipline each other’s couponing behaviors. We find Foucault’s framework applicable with some modification. Participants use discursive techniques to establish hierarchical surveillance however hierarchies are not upheld throughout the interactions, making lateral surveillance more (...) applicable. Participants engage in normalizing judgment by critiquing and correcting “deviant” behavior and positively reinforcing “good” behavior. The blog itself mirrors the examination; as the blog master describes activities, participants try them, and return to the site to report their results, which can then be compared to others. These findings illustrate online interactions as a mechanism of informal social surveillance and control. (shrink)

One cue that may facilitate children's word learning is iconicity, or the correspondence between a word's form and meaning. Some have even proposed that iconicity in the early lexicon may serve to help children learn how to learn words, supporting the acquisition of even noniconic, or arbitrary, word–referent associations. However, this proposal remains untested. Here, we investigate the iconicity of caregivers’ speech to young children during a naturalistic free‐play session with novel stimuli and ask whether the iconicity of caregivers’ speech (...) facilitates children's learning of the noniconic novel names of those stimuli. Thirty‐four 1.5‐2‐year‐olds (19 girls; half monolingual English learners and half bilingual English‐Spanish learners) participated in a naturalistic free‐play task with their caregivers followed by a test of word‐referent retention. We found that caregivers’ use of iconicity, particularly in utterances in which they named the novel stimuli, was associated with the likelihood that children learned that novel name. This result held even when controlling for other factors associated with word learning, such as the concreteness and frequency of words in caregiver speech. Together, the results demonstrate that iconicity not only can serve to help children identify the referent of novel words (as in previous research) but can also support their ability to retain even noniconic word‐referent mappings. (shrink)

When a caregiver names objects dominating a child’s view, the association between object and name is unambiguous and children are more likely to learn the object’s name. Children also learn to name things other than solid objects, including nonsolid substances like applesauce. However, it is unknown how caregivers structure linguistic and exploratory experiences with nonsolids to support learning. In this exploratory study of caregivers and children we compare caregiver-child free-play with novel solid objects and novel nonsolid substances to identify the (...) linguistic and exploratory experiences associated with children’s word learning. We found systematic differences in interactions with novel objects, such that children performed more manual actions on solids than nonsolids and caregivers named solids more than nonsolids. Additionally, there was less synchrony between caregivers’ naming and children’s manual and visual exploration of nonsolids than solids. Consistent with prior work, we found that synchronous naming was associated with accurate recognition of solid object names. However, naming synchrony was not associated with recognition of nonsolid substance names or with generalization. Together these findings, though exploratory, suggest the coordination of caregiver-child play can shape what children remember about novel word-object associations for solid objects, but not nonsolid substances. (shrink)

Much research on cognitive development focuses either on early-emerging domain-specific knowledge or domain-general learning mechanisms. However, little research examines how these sources of knowledge interact. Previous research suggests that young infants can make inferences from samples to populations (Xu & Garcia, 2008) and 11- to 12.5-month-old infants can integrate psychological and physical knowledge in probabilistic reasoning (Teglas, Girotto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 2007; Xu & Denison, 2009). Here, we ask whether infants can integrate a physical constraint of immobility into a statistical (...) inference mechanism. Results from three experiments suggest that, first, infants were able to use domain-specific knowledge to override statistical information, reasoning that sometimes a physical constraint is more informative than probabilistic information. Second, we provide the first evidence that infants are capable of applying domain-specific knowledge in probabilistic reasoning by using a physical constraint to exclude one set of objects while computing probabilities over the remaining sets. (shrink)

Young children learn about the power of God's love and creation through simple text and illustrations.

"New foreword by Rhian Evans Allvin"--Cover.

Introduction -- Get political -- The animals need you -- Animal advocacy 101 -- Share the love -- The political beast -- Money talks -- Compassion in the classroom -- The power of words -- Find your pack -- Get wild -- Green is the new black -- Chaper 10: conservation uncaged -- Neighborhood bird watch -- Unplug climate change -- Plastic detox -- Down the drain -- Take extinction off your plate -- Let's talk about sex -- The call (...) of the wild -- Get personal -- The animals aren't amused -- Clean conscience -- What not to wear -- Old MacDonald lost his farm -- Holiday hangover -- Don't get catfished -- If you see something, say something -- The ambassador of dogville -- Unconditional love -- Be the change -- Appendix: additional resources -- Notes. (shrink)

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...) together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitive empathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion; empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher Bartel attempts to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. The dilemma, formulated by Morgan Luck, goes as follows: there is no principled distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. So, we’ll have to give up either our intuition that virtual murder is morally permissible—seemingly leaving us over-moralizing our gameplay—or our intuition that acts of virtual pedophilia are morally troubling—seemingly leaving us under-moralizing our game play. Bartel’s attempted resolution relies on establishing the following three theses: (1) (...) virtual pedophilia is child pornography, (2) the consumption of child pornography is morally wrong, and (3) virtual murder is not murder. Relying on Michael Rea’s definition of pornography, I argue that we should reject thesis one, but since Bartel’s moral argument in thesis two does not actually rely thesis one that his resolution is not thereby undermined. Still, even if we grant that there are adequate resources internal to Bartel’s account to technically resolve the gamer’s dilemma his reasoning is still unsatisfying. This is so because Bartel follows Neil Levy in arguing that virtual pedophilia is wrong because it harms women. While I grant Levy’s account, I argue that this is the wrong kind of reason to resolve the gamer’s dilemma because it is indirect. What we want is to know what is wrong with virtual child pornography itself. Finally, I suggest alternate moral resources for resolving the gamer’s dilemma that are direct in a way that Bartel’s resources are not. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist (...) is mistaken and that there are non-consequentialist resources for morally evaluating our single-player game play. On my view, some video games contain details that anyone who has a proper understanding of and is properly sensitive to features of a shared moral reality will see as having an incorrigible social meaning that targets groups of individuals, e.g., women and minorities. I offer arguments to support the claim that there are such incorrigible social meanings and that they constrain the imaginative world so that challenges like “it’s only a game” lose their credibility. I also argue that our responses to such meanings bear on evaluations of our character, and in light of this fact video game designers have a duty to understand and work against the meanings of such imagery. (shrink)

This book is of interest to anyone reading Aristotle, from beginners to specialists, and also to all those who are interested in the set of metaphysical problems surrounding persons.

Do you wake up in the morning and still feel tired? Do your supposedly relaxing activities actually just feel like another thing to check off that to-do-list? Do you feel like you never really have time to recharge? It's time to rethink rest! Rest is no longer about just getting a good night's sleep or taking an evening to relax on the couch and watch TV. It's a radical act of self-care that asks you to take into account all the (...) different aspects of yourself that need to rest and take a break. And The Little Book of Rest has everything you need to get started. In this book, you'll find restful solutions that will impact each of every part of yourself. With insight into why resting-really resting-can benefit you and your community as a whole, this book is your guide to slowing down, letting go, and finding peace and healing within yourself. (shrink)

L’article s’efforce, à partir de l’analyse des expressions allemandes employées par le jeune Marx, de vérifier la thèse communément admise selon laquelle on ne trouverait dans ce corpus qu’une critique de l’intérêt général tel qu’il a été formulé sous la Révolution française, censé dissimuler l’intérêt de la bourgeoisie. L’analyse fait apparaître qu’une telle critique côtoie un effort théorique pour penser un « intérêt commun » ou « humain » qui, dépassant l’antagonisme des classes, pourrait prendre en charge l’intérêt de tous (...) et de chacun. (shrink)

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...) to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain sui generis normative properties. This (...) is the only metaphysical explanation for supervenience on offer, the chapter argues, that can both clearly maintain the pre-theoretical commitments of non-naturalism, and provide a metaphysical explanation not just for supervenience, but for all metaphysical necessities involving natural and normative properties. (shrink)

With the growth of precision medicine research on health data and biospecimens, research institutions will need to build and maintain long-term, trusting relationships with patient-participants. While trust is important for all research relationships, the longitudinal nature of precision medicine research raises particular challenges for facilitating trust when the specifics of future studies are unknown. Based on focus groups with racially and ethnically diverse patients, we describe several factors that influence patient trust and potential institutional approaches to building trustworthiness. Drawing on (...) these findings, we suggest several considerations for research institutions seeking to cultivate long-term, trusting relationships with patients: Address the role of history and experience on trust, engage concerns about potential group harm, address cultural values and communication barriers, and integrate patient values and expectations into oversight and governance structures. (shrink)

What is justice? How do we know justice? How is justice cultivated in society? These are the three questions that guide this critical dialogue with two representatives of the Catholic and Protestant traditions: Karl Barth and Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II. Though the two thought leaders are shaped within divergent theological traditions and historical contexts, they both appeal to Christian anthropology as a starting point for justice. Their explorations into the nature of humanity yield robust new theories of justice that remain (...) relevant for our contemporary era. The third interlocutor brings her own voice fully into the dialogue in the third part of the book in order to address the shortcomings in their theories and build upon their insights, all the while seeking theories of humanity and social justice that result in justice for all persons. --back cover. (shrink)

Many physiotherapists are reluctant to treat a client with bone metastases, as treatment indications are not clearly defined. The paradigmatic case presented here, and a review of the literature, allow us to highlight some ethical and clinical issues in physiotherapy care at the end of life, particularly for patients with bone metastases. The objective of this article is not to create an ethical decision making model but rather to serve as additional guidance to existing decision models in rehabilitation. This guidance (...) is based on principlism and is specific to the oncology clients in palliative care. The proposed principles, without being exhaustive, are beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice. With a review of clinical indications and precautions, the article also helps to clarify both the theoretical and the evidence-based risks. These principles provide avenues for reflection to guide the management of these patients. The physiotherapist will then be able to conduct a critical analysis, in collaboration with the interdisciplinary team, whose goal is to respect the client’s right to appropriate care at the right time and that is based on clinical need. (shrink)

Passivité et création est un livre ancré dans une double pratique: la peinture et la philosophie. Sa composition s'inspire du trajet suivi par Maurice Merleau-Ponty dans l'élaboration de son cours au Collège de France de 1954-1955: "Le problème de la passivité: le sommeil, l'inconscient, la mémoire". A partir de l'étude de la pratique de certains artistes et de l'analyse de textes philosophiques, il s'agit de décrire une passivité de forme particulière, une passivité "opérante", corrélative d'une forme dynamique de la subjectivité. (...) Cette passivité, "dimension d'un mouvement dont je suis le médiateur, mais qui d'une certaine façon se fait en moi sans moi, à mon insu", de nombreux artistes du 20. siècle s'en sont faits les témoins (Arp, Bacon, Dubuffet, Klee, Michaux, Rauschenberg, Schwitters, Spoerri, Nicolas de Staël, Bram Van Velde...), appelant aussi cette expérience "inconscient", "hasard", "imprévu", "surprise". Dans la perspective esquissée ici, l'accès aux autres cesse alors d'être un "problème". L'autre a déjà sa part dans mon expérience la plus singulière. Mon expérience peut devenir expérience pour d'autres parce qu'elle s'inscrit au sein d'une dimension phénoménologique qui n'est ni de moi ni d'autrui, mais commune. Quel est le rôle de cette passivité structurelle dans la création comprise comme transformation de la vision et du monde lui-même? Et comment peut-on en retourner la fragilité en pouvoir? (shrink)